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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has been fighting the importation, distribution,
and possession of illicit drugs for a long time.' However, only within
the past fifteen to twenty years has international drug control become a
major priority in the formulation of United States foreign policy. The
recent United States emphasis on international drug control appears to
be a result of the perceived national security threat posed by domestic
increases in drug consumption, drug-related crime, and chemical de-
pendency, and by the strength of multinational enterprises involved in
1. Nineteenth century legislation includes the Act of February 23, 1887, Chap.
210, 24 Stat. 409, which banned the importation of opium into the United States by
Chinese subjects and criminalized participation of United States citizens in opium traf-
ficking. Hogan & Doyle, The Federal Response: A Growing Role, CRS Rv. (Nov.-
Dec. 1989). The beginning of the 20th century was marked by a meeting of the newly
created Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 and by a Hague Conference and accom-
panying international convention in 1912. Id. at 11. See Hague Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, Jan. 23, 1912, T.S. No. 612, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187. Following from the
prescriptions of the Hague Convention, which advocated greater domestic drug control,
Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785,
which remained the principal drug control statute in the United States until 1970.
Hogan & Doyle, supra, at 12. The Harrison Act was a tax law requiring all those
legally involved in narcotics commerce to register with the Internal Revenue Service, to
pay a tax, and to comply with certain order form requirements. Id. at 11. In 1937,
Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, which
mirrored the Harrison act. Between 1935 and 1963, Congress increased the penalties
for unlawful distribution and possession of illicit drugs. Hogan & Doyle, supra.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy formed the President's Advisory Commission
on Narcotics and Drug Abuse (the Prettyman Commission), and the Commission's
1963 report served as a blueprint for legislation in the years that followed. Id. at 12;
see also Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961., 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (amended by 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118,
976 U.N.T.S. 3). In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1285, which made substantial changes in the system of penalties
for violations of law and increased regulation of the pharmaceuticals industry. Hogan
& Doyle, supra, at 12; see also Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971,
T.I.A.S. No. 9725, 1019 U.N.T.S. 14956. More recent United States domestic legal
machinations and international agreements concerning drug control are addressed infra
notes 3, 67, 70, and 106.
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drug trafficking.2
Although the United States seems to be amenable to multilateral
approaches devoted to the reduction of international drug trafficking, a
more searching inquiry reveals that it has given such approaches short
shrift.3 Rather, the United States takes the position that expanding ex-
traterritorially the reach of its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its
criminal laws is the most effective way of reducing international drug
2. See THE WnITE HousE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES 7, 28 (1990). Consumption of and trafficking in illicit drugs is also on the rise
in Western Europe. See Zagaris & Fantauzzi, European Integration and the Volcano
of Illicit Drug Trafficking: Will 1992 Bring the Promised Avalanche of Cooperation?,
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 190 (May 1990); Ernestus, West German Government
Considers Three Anti-Narcotics Initiatives, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 201 (May
1990). Some commentators have suggested that the relatively new United States em-
phasis on international drug control stems from the loss of the Soviet Union as the
prime United States enemy. In essence, the United States has chosen drug traffickers
as the "new" enemy. Nightline: Washington's Dwindling Importance (ABC television
broadcast April 27, 1990) (comments of P.J. O'Rourke, columnist for Rolling Stone
Magazine). Note, however, that such commentary preceded more recent events in the
Persian Gulf.
3. From the beginning, the United States has participated in the search for mul-
tilateral solutions to stem international traffic in illicit drugs. See generally Bassiouni,
The International Narcotics Control Scheme, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
PROCEDURE 507 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986); Comment, International Narcotics Control:
A Proposal to Eradicate an International Menace, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 530 (1984).
The United States is a party to the most recent multilateral convention, see United
Nations: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15, Corr. 1 and Corr. 2, reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 493 (1989), and has endorsed the establishment of an International Criminal
Court with jurisdiction over internationally recognized crimes such as terrorism, nar-
cotics trafficking, genocide, and torture. See H.R. Con. Res. 66 (1990) (Currently
under review by subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and
International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,'United States House of
Representatives).
Despite all of this, the United States has insisted on pursuing its own policy and
prescribing and enforcing extraterritorially its domestic law. In this regard, the lack of
United States financial support of multilateral and regional agencies charged with initi-
ating programs to fight narcotics production, processing, trafficking, and abuse, such as
the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), reveals the actual absence of United
States commitment to multilateral and regional solutions. For example, in Fiscal Year
1989, the United States Congress earmarked a mere $2,000,000 to UNFDAC and only
$1,000,000 to CICAD. International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 2222
(1988). In 1990, there was no such appropriation.
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trafficking.4
While the United States policy is certainly bilateral in nature be-
cause extraterritorial enforcement of domestic criminal law requires
the cooperation of other states, it is a mistake to infer that such cooper-
ation is always voluntary. This is particularly true when the United
States policy involves third world nations, where the culture differs rad-
ically thereby heightening the probability of friction caused by conffict-
ing political priorities. Ultimately, when a less developed country is re-
luctant to cooperate with United States international drug control
policy, the United States wastes no time in resorting to its substantial
bargaining power. Thus, the United States drug control relationship
with many third world nations is actually one of at least partial coer-
cion.5 Naturally, such arm-twisting by any nation in pursuit of a for-
eign policy objective is bound to upset the governments with which that
country must work, but which may have differing perspectives on, and
approaches to, the same objective. This describes the current situation
existing among the United States and certain Latin American
countries.6
4. On the expanding nature of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and enforce see Zagaris & Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional Considera-
tions in International Criminal Law, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303 (1935); see also Note,
Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National In-
terest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. Rnv. 1273 (1990).
5. See infra note 70.
6. United States pursuit of international drug control by such means is usually
defended by United States officials and other proponents on moral grounds. This, in
turn, is reflective of a general United States attitude which has been particularly preva-
lent throughout the post-war era. In this regard, one well known commentator has
suggested:
The disproportionately high level of United States activity and initiative in
the international enforcement of criminal law reflects attitudes characteris-
tic of United States approaches to international relations. Most notably,
United States citizens often assume that the United States is obligated and
even destined to play a leading role in dealing with most international
problems. Far more than any other nation, the United States defines its
national interests in such broad terms that few significant events lie outside
their ambit. Global networks of military personnel, intelligence agents, and
law enforcement officials are required merely to look after this wide array
of interests. Yet criminal justice has historically been a dcmestic issue.
Hence, other governments naturally respond to the United States expan-
sive criminal law enforcement efforts with a mixture of gratitude, resent-
ment, and ambivalence. Like other areas of international cooperation and
conflict, foreign states welcome much of the United States assistance yet
[Vol. 15
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Ultimately, the United States' position has had an adverse impact
on its ability to carry out a successful drug control policy with the An-
dean nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru-the producing, process-
ing, and trafficking nations responsible for most of the world's supply of
cocaine.7 Colombia presents a particular problem because it is the
home of some of the most successful drug traffickers, and it is the traf-
fickers whom the United States seeks to immobilize by subjecting them
to the jurisdiction of its criminal laws. In this regard, the United States
has had to work closely with Colombia to facilitate the extradition of
suspected traffickers from that country to the United States.
The relationship that has evolved between the United States and
Colombia is notable for its schizophrenia. On one hand, the United
States demands the extradition of Colombian citizens suspected of
breaking United States laws against drug trafficking, even where a sus-
pect has acted wholly outside of United States territory. On the other
hand, cocaine consumption is not a serious problem in Colombia, and
drug trafficking is viewed by Colombians as one which can be reduced
react testily to the demands and pressures that frequently accompany it.
Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Crimi-
nal Law, 31 HARv. INT'L LJ. 37, 39-40 (1990).
7. The policy has also strained United States relations with important Latin
American allies such as Mexico, Costa Rica, and Honduras. With regard to Mexico,
most recently the United States orchestrated the forceful abduction of Dr. Humberto
Alvarez Machain to face charges in the United States stemming from the 1985 murder
of DEA agent Enrique Camarena. The abduction was carried out without the host
government's permission, and resulted in a severe rebuke from Mexican President Car-
los Salinas de Gortari. See U.S. Says it Won't Return Mexican Doctor Linked to Drug
Trafficking, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Ultimately, the trial court de-
cided that the abduction was illegal, and that Alvarez must be returned to Mexico.
United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Defendant was
Abducted in DEA Case, Judge Says, Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1990, at A3, col. 5.
With regard to Costa Rica, the only established democracy in Central America,
the foreign policy of the former Reagan Administration toward Nicaragua, i.e., encour-
aging United States assistance to the Nicaraguan contras by any means possible, in-
cluding participation in drug trafficking, led to Costa Rica's current status as a trans-
shipment point for cocaine and marijuana. See Deputies Move to Continue Narcotics
Probe, Tico Times (Costa Rica), May 11, 1990, at 5, col. 1; Accused U.S. Drug Traf-
ficker Reported Comfy, Tico Times, May 4, 1990, at 32, col. 1.
As to Honduras, in April, 1988, the United States pressured that country to de-
port to the United States suspected drug trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros. See
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 209
(1990); U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Nadeimann,
supra note 6, at 73.
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through demand reduction in the United States combined with pro-
grams which will help stimulate the Colombian economy.8 Colombians
object to having their fellow citizens extradited and tried in the United
States, a nation whose culture and legal tradition differ markedly from
those of Colombia, and whose people are the primary users of cocaine.9
Colombians assert that drug trafficking suspects who are Colombian
citizens should be tried in Colombia, if at all.
Of course, the United States' response to the Colombian position is
that the Colombian justice system is paralyzed by drug-related violence
and corruption and, therefore, is incapable of dealing effectively with
the problem. 10 Thus, to the United States, the only solution is to bring
alleged traffickers, including Colombian citizens, to the United States
for trial.
The problem with the "paralysis" argument is that it is bolstered
by at least three as yet unquestioned assumptions. First, the argument
assumes that the United States' justice system is dealing effectively
with international drug trafficking because those being extradited, pros-
ecuted, and convicted are important players in the drug :rafficking bus-
iness, and their convictions will reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States. A second assumption is that Colombia should view the
drug trafficking problem with a moral disdain equal to that of the
United States. Finally, the argument assumes that all of the violence in
Colombia attributed to drug traffickers has been, in fact, carried out by
8. See Colombia Leader Emphasizes Anti-Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12,
1990, at A6, col. 1 (discussing new Colombian President Cesar Gavaria Trujillo's posi-
tion that while "drug terrorism" is a Colombian problem, narcotics trafficking is "an
international phenomenon that can only be resolved through joint action of all affected
countries. . . [including] a substantial reduction in demand in comnumer countries").
9. See Extraditables Iniciaron Huelga de Hambre en Bogota, El Siglo (Colom-
bia), July 9, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Bogota Chief Tells of Drug War's Toll, N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1990, at A3, col. 4; Bogota Mayor Advocates Talks with Traffickers, Wash.
Post, April 24, 1990, at Al8, col. 1; Americans, Colombians Disagree Over Drug War,
Survey Shows, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1990, at A18, col. 4.
10. Proponents of this argument cite as justification the killings of Colombian
judges and politicians, and other brutal acts against the government and citizens attrib-
uted to members of the illegal drug business. They also cite the 1987 release of sus-
pected drug trafficker Jorge Ochoa from detention in a Colombian prison-presumedly
the result of a kickback. However, these same commentators uniformly fail to give any
credence to the fact that Ochoa was released pursuant to an affirmative judicial finding
of unlawful detention following his petition for a writ of habeas orpus. See, e.g., S.
McDoNALD, DANCING ON A VOLCANO: THE LATIN AMERICAN DRUG TRADIE 41
(1988).
[Vol. 15
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the traffickers. Each of these assumptions is dubious.
While the United States has extradited fourteen Colombian drug
trafficking suspects since August, 1989,11 none of the suspects are high
level members of the illicit drug business, despite claims to the con-
trary.12 Rather, these people are, if anything, low-level actors who can-
not afford the political and paramilitary protection paid for by major
traffickers.13 If these "extraditables" are at all engaged in international
11. August, 1989 marked Colombia's resumption of extradition to the United
States of suspected drug traffickers. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
12. A case in point is that of Jose Rafael Abello Silva, a Colombian extradited to
the United States in October, 1989. Initially, Abello was reported to be a high ranking
member of the Medellin Cartel. See Medellin Suspect Extradited to the U.S., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1989, at A13, col. 1 (high-level operative of Medellin Cartel); Suspect
is Extradited, Newsday, Oct. 30, 1989, at 12 (Abello said to rank "number four" in
the Medellin Cartel); U.S. Jails Accused Master Drug Smuggler, L.A. Times, Oct. 30,
1989, at A4, col. 4 (Abello accused of being Medellin Cartel's "master drug smug-
gler"). Abello was initially indicted in the United States in 1987 with three others on
drug trafficking conspiracy charges. United States v. Palmero, No. 87-CR-140-B (N.D.
Okla. filed Sept. 2, 1987); United States v. Palmero, No. 87-CR-140-B (N.D. Okla.
filed Oct. 7, 1987) (superseding indictment).
Abello's alleged co-conspirators all pled guilty and agreed to testify against or
provide information on him in exchange for light sentences. This led to the filing of a
second superseding indictment naming only Abello. See United States v. Abello Silva,
No. 87-CR-140-B (N.D. Okla. filed Jan. 3, 1990). The only testimony as to Abello's
participation in the alleged conspiracy was that of his former co-defendants, persons
related to his former co-defendants, other convicts, and Federal Bureau of Investigation
Agents. Despite the previous news reports, Abello's position within the Medellin Cartel,
if any ever existed, was never established. Ultimately, the jury saw its way clear to
convict Abello and Judge Thomas Brett sentenced him to thirty years in prison, the
maximum allowable under the existing United States-Colombia extradition regime. See
Extradited Colombian Drug Trafficker Sentenced to Thirty Years, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
May 29, 1990; Jury Convicts Reputed Key Colombian Drug Figure, L.A. Times, May
20 1990, at A27, col. 1 (Abello reported as "reputed ... key figure in the Medellin
Cartel). Regarding the current United States-Colombia extradition regime, see infra
notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
13. A case in point here is that of Edward Mitchell, a United States citizen
extradited from Colombia in July 1990. Mitchell was indicted in the United States on
charges of conspiracy in 1983. The charges stem from his alleged role in a Colombia-
Milwaukee, Wisconsin cocaine ring. United States v. Mitchell, No. 83-CR-86 (E.D
Wis. filed June 14, 1983). Notably, in light of the news reports which followed the
Abello extradition, and the lack of such reports following Mitchell's extradition, one
can reasonably deduce that Mitchell was not considered a major suspect. Indeed, it
seems that anyone who is considered to be a "drug baron" stands little chance of mak-
ing it out of Colombia alive. For example, in 1989, alleged Colombian cocaine traf-
ficker Jose Gonsalo Rodriguez Gacha was killed by Colombian police. The last "ma-
19911
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drug trafficking, it is clear that they are considered by their superiors to
be expendable and are, therefore, easy targets for the Colombian au-
thorities and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA). Additionally, despite the fact that recreational drug consump-
tion is not a problem in Colombia, the United States has asked Colom-
bian civilians to support a policy which has helped transform their
country into a police state. At the same time, the Unit~ed States has
been unwilling to engage in a comprehensive drug demand reduction
program. Lastly, it is not clear that all of the violence carried out
against the Colombian government and justice system is attributable to
the traffickers. To be sure, the traffickers are a dangerous and violent
group. However, it must also be recognized that Colombian society has
been for many years characterized by violence; it is permeated with
various guerilla, paramilitary fascist and rural "self-protection"
groups, 4 and government military and police organizations which act
with virtual autonomy.15
There is much more to international drug trafficking than meets
the eye, and the current United States policy is unable to meet the
challenge. United States' international drug control policy has ad-
dressed neither cultural, political, nor socioeconomic underpinnings
which have given rise to the major role of Colombia in international
drug trafficking."8 Neither has the United States considered the sensi-
tivity of Latin American nations to outside intervention.17
The analysis cannot end here, however. While coercion has had
much to do with the Colombian government's cooperation with United
States international drug control policy, it does not tell the whole story.
jor" cocaine trafficker to be brought to the United States was Carlos Lehder-Rivas in
1987.
14. See infra notes 42, 46 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 32.
16. For example, many poor Colombians view the drug business as the only via-
ble alternative to climb the economic ladder in the absence of an effective welfare state.
See Medellin Journal: In the Capital of Cocaine, Savagery is the Habit, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Though largely unreported in the United States, much of
the drug-related violence in Colombia is the result of turf wars taling place between
private armies commanded by members of the Colombian elite, such as Victor Cor-
ranza, who are engaged in cocaine trafficking, and those of nonmembers such as Pablo
Escobar, Jorge Ochoa, and, formerly, Jose Gonsalo Rodriguez Gacha.
17. See Charter of the Organization of American States, arts 19, 20, and 21
(declaring nonintervention as a principle). This sensitivity was most recently witnessed
in the aftermath of the United States invasion of Panama in December 1989. See La-
tins Leery of U.S. Military, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
[Vol. 15
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In Colombia, as in the United States, there are members of govern-
ment who have used the drug trafficking issue for personal and political
advantage. In addition, because many high ranking Colombian politi-
cians have strong familial or commercial ties with the United States
and do not want to jeopardize those ties, they lack the political Will to
diverge from United States policy. While there have been brief periods
in Colombia's recent political history where the government has sought
to distance itself from the United States, 18 the domination of Colom-
bian politics by members of the small social elite, and the considerable
political influence of Colombian police and military organizations, have
assured continued official Colombian support for Washington's policies.
The practical effect on Colombian society resulting from the
United States international drug control policy and Colombian govern-
mental complicity with that policy has been further detraction of Co-
lombia's ability to govern itself according to the rule of law. The con-
tinued extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States, despite
adverse rulings on the subject by the Colombian Supreme Court of Jus-
.tice (SCJ), has caused bitterness among the intensely proud Colombian
populace. The government stands accused of pandering to United
States interests while Colombian society remains under a system of
martial law which only promotes continued violence.19 The United
States does virtually nothing to effectively encourage the Colombian
government to abide by the Colombian Constitution and to appropriate
funds aimed at strengthening that country's understaffed, underequip-
ped,20 and overburdened judicial system. 1 Rather, the United States
encourages the Colombian Executive to usurp legislative and judicial
power and to increase the power of the military and police.
This article examines the steady deterioration of order in Colom-
bian society through an explanation and analysis of the Colombia-
United States extradition relationship in historical and political con-
text. The article shows that the Colombian government's current inabil-
ity to institute and effectuate the rule of law is a result of two destruc-
tive forces acting in concert: The first force is that of a United States
drug control policy which emphasizes extraterritorial prescription and
enforcement of domestic criminal laws - including extradition of Co-
18. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
20. See Fricker, A Judiciary Under Fire, A.BAJ. 54 (Feb. 1990).
21. See Grossman & Anderson, Lawyers and the Rule of Law in the Western
Hemisphere, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rnv. 115, 124-25 (1988).
1991]
9
Sherman: United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradition, and
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
lombian citizens to the United States - rather than assisting Colombia
in enforcing its own laws and rebuilding its justice system. The second
force is the Colombian elite's desire for political and, therefore, eco-
nomic self-perpetuation which prevents the nation from effectively
"dealigning" itself from United States policy. It is suggested that if the
United States is truly interested in reducing illicit drug traffic, and if
Colombia is truly interested in creating a more stable social climate,
both countries must undertake fundamental changes in thinking and
policymaking.
II. THE UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA EXTRADITION
RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
A. The Early Years
1. The 1888 Convention and 1940 Supplementary Convention
Colombia enacted its current constitution in 1886. Two years
later, the initial extradition convention between the United States and
Colombia was signed,22 and went into force on January 1.1, 1891.23 The
1888 Convention was the typical enumerative type; it listed the crimes
for which an accused would be subject to extradition.24 Notably, the
1888 Convention did not provide for extradition on the basis of crimes
relating to illicit drug trafficking. Additionally, the 1888 Convention
advocated against extradition of United States or Colombian
nationals. 25
By 1940, it had become apparent to United States officials that
Colombia was a source of illicit drugs. Consumption of such substances
in the United States was increasing as was the number of crime organi-
zations involved in its importation and distribution. Thus, the United
States and Colombia amended the 1888 Convention to include
"[c]rimes against the laws for the suppression of the traffic in narcot-
22. Convention for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, May 7, 1888,
United States-Colombia, 26 Stat. 1534, T.S. 58 [hereinafter 1888 Convention].
23. Id.
24. Id. at art. 2. Typically, where an extradition treaty exists, the issue of
whether a particular alleged crime subjects an accused to extradition is determined by
either listing the specific offenses in the text of, or in the appendix lo the treaty, or by
establishing the degree of punishment according to which an offense shall be extradita-
ble. Comment, RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 TEMPLE L. REv. 1281,
1295 (1989).
25. 1888 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 10.
[Vol. 15670
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ics."28 This Supplementary Convention went into effect on July 6,
1943.7
2. Dark Times in Colombian Politics
Until very recently, Colombian politics was characterized by a
two-party system.28 Each of these parties, the Liberals and the Con-
servatives, was dominated by the nation's small socioeconomic elite.29
26. Supplementary Convention of Extradition, Sept. 9, 1940, United States-Co-
lombia, art. 1, 57 Stat. 824, T.S. 986 [hereinafter 1940 Supplementary Convention].
27. Id. At this point it should also be mentioned that the there are two relevant
multilateral extradition treaties in force. In 1933, as part of the Seventh International
Conference of American States in Montivideo, Uruguay, the United States and other
American republics signed the Pan American Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. 882 [hereinafter Pan American Convention]. The purpose of
this convention is to effectuate extradition where there is no existing extradition treaty
among the signatories or where an existing treaty lapses. In other words, the Pan
American Convention "does not abrogate or modify the bilateral or collective treaties,
which at the present date are in force between the signatory States." Id. at art. 21.
Unlike the bilateral 1888 Convention, supra note 22, and 1940 Supplementary Conven-
tion, supra note 26, which enumerate the particular extraditable offenses, the Pan
American Convention simply relies on a conditional reciprocity requirement. Pan
American Convention, supra, at art. 1. In essence, each of the signatory states promises
to surrender an accused to a requesting signatory state based on certain conditions.
Each signatory state contracts to surrender to the requesting state a person "who may
be in their territory and who [is] accused or under sentence," id., where:
a) [T]he demanding State ha[s] the jurisdiction to try and to punish the
delinquency which is attributed to the individual whom it desires to
extradite.
b) [T]he act for which extradition is sought constitutes a crime and is
punishable under the laws of the demanding and surrendering States with
a minimum penalty of imprisonment for one year.
Id. at art. 1(a), (b).
An interesting and innovative aspect of the Pan American Convention is that unlike
traditional extradition treaties, the Pan American Convention provides for discretion-
ary delivery of a signatory state's citizens unless such delivery is precluded by the sur-
rendering state's internal legislation or by the "circumstances of the case" as deter-
mined by the surrendering state. Id. at art. 2.
The second multilateral treaty is of more recent vintage but cannot be applied in
extradition situations involving the United States. Despite its formulation under the
auspices of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention on
Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, O.A.S., T.S. No. 60 (OEA/Ser. A/36) has not yet been
signed by the United States.
28. See infra note 42.
29. Findley, Presidential Intervention in the Economy and the Rule of Law in
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During the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's, national politics was
influenced by the Liberal Party. 0 In 1946 the Conservative Party took
power.31 The Conservative government formed the Departamento Ad-
ministrativo de Seguridad (DAS), a police organization with extraordi-
nary investigative and military capability. Although technically a part
of the Ministry of Interior, DAS operates with virtual autonomy. 2
In 1948, amid an increasingly violent political atmosphere, the
populist, left-leaning Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitdn, was assassi-
nated.33 The blame for Gaitdn's death was attributed to rightist ele-
ments of the Conservative government, and Colombia soon became em-
broiled in a bloody civil war known as La Violencia 4 In 1949, the
government declared a state of siege.3 5 In 1950, another Conservative
Colombia, 28 Am. J. COMP. L. 423, 425 (1980); see generally R. Dix, COLOMBIA: THE
POLITICAL DIMENSION OF CHANGE (1967).
30. Bagley & Tokatlian, Politica Exterior de Colombia en los 80, in CON-
TINUIDAD Y CAMBIO EN LAS RELACIONES AMERICA LATINA/ETADOS UNIDOS 151, 176
n.50 (M. Hirst ed. 1987).
31. Id.
32. DAS is usually analogized to the United States Department of Justice's Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See Drug Lord's Base Hurt, Officials Say: Cartel
Leader Escobar Fleeing Into Jungle to Escape Dragnet, Wash. Post, July 14, 1990, at
A23. While in many respects DAS resembles the FBI, the former wields much more
power. Under the state of siege, see infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text, the gov-
ernment grants extraordinary powers to the police and military, allowing them to es-
cape civilian control and oversight. In turn, organizations such as DAS, with sophisti-
cated intelligence and military capability, pursue their own agendas and hold
themselves out as defending the state against those allegedly seeking to destroy it. The
current head of DAS, General Miguel' Maza Marquez, is both praised and criticized in
Colombia. He has been praised by conservatives for sustaining a hard line against drug
traffickers, and for uncovering corruption within the armed forces. See Colombian
Anti-Drug Hero's Post in Doubt, Newsday, July 5, 1990, at 13. On the other hand,
Maza has been criticized for turning a blind eye to serious human rights violations
committed by members of DAS. Id. Also, Maza himself has been ao-used of accepting
payments from drug traffickers who are members of the established social elite (the
Cali and Emerald Cartels). Id. In this regard, it has been rumored in Colombia that
the 1989 death of reputed cocaine trafficker Jose Gonsalo Rodrignez Gacha at the
hands of DAS was actually carried out by Maza at the request of either the Cali or
Emerald Cartels or both. It seems that Rodriguez was making inroads into legitimate
businesses operated by the Cali and Emerald Cartels and used by them as a front for
cocaine trafficking.
33. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30.
34. Id. See also Findley, supra note 29.
35. Findley, supra note 29, at 426. For a discussion of the state of siege and its
effect on the rule of law in Colombia, see infra notes 71-126 and accompanying text.
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was elected president when the Liberals refused to nominate a candi-
date.36 In 1953, the civilian government was overthrown in a military
coup led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla who then imposed a morato-
rium on all organized political activity.3 7 In 1957, Conservative and
Liberal leaders forced the ouster of Rojas and called for election of a
civilian president. The Constitution was then amended to allow for a
Liberal-Conservative coalition government for the next sixteen years.38
Under the plan, known as the National Front, the parties equally di-
vided between themselves seats in all legislative, judicial, and executive
bodies.39 The presidency alternated every four years.40 Ultimately,
there was not a competitive election until the National Front disbanded
in 1974.41
Sixteen years of National Front leadership provided more than
enough time for the incubation of militant political groups which were
dissatisfied with a status quo favoring the elite. Indeed, it was during
the National Front period that various guerilla groups such as the Fu-
erzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejercito de
Liberacibn Nacional (ELN), and Ejercito Popular de Liberacibn
(EPL) formed and became powerful, appealing to Colombia's poor by
espousing variations of communist ideology.42
36. Findley, supra note 29, at 426.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 176 n.50.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 171 n.40. FARC, a Marxist-Leninist group, actually traces its origins
as far back as the period of La Violencia and currently is Colombia's most powerful
guerilla organization. Id. The ELN, which aligns itself more directly with Fidel Castro,
and the EPL, which espouses Maoist ideology, commenced their operations in the
1960's. Id.
Over the past year, many of Colombia's guerilla groups have begun to lay down
their arms and integrate themselves into the political process. In early 1990, the
Movimiento 19 de Abril de 1970 (M-19) organization, a powerful populist guerilla
group formed after the 1970 presidential elections, publicly laid down its arms. In the
May, 1990 elections, the M-19 presidential candidate, Antonio Navarro Wolff, gar-
nered thirteen percent of the vote despite the unexplained assassination of the organiza-
tion's initial presidential candidate. See Brooke, Colombia's Guerillas Break Into
Politics, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1990, at E5, col. 1; Brooke, Colombia Rebels Shun Arms
and Win Votes, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, at A15, col. 1. Subsequently, Navarro was
named Minister of Health by President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo. See Colombian Gueril-
las Forsake the Gun for Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1990, at A14, col. 1 (reporting
on demobilization of the EPL, the indigenous self-defense group Quintin Lame, and the
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B. The Recent Record
1. Post-National Front Colombian Politics and Relations with the
United States
By the mid-1970's, trafficking in and use of illegal drugs had be-
come a major issue within the United States, and it was at this time
that the problem began to seriously manifest itself in the relations be-
tween Colombia and the United States. In response to the large
amounts of marijuana which were being imported into the United
States from Colombia, then United States President Jimmy Carter re-
quested of then Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, that
elimination of marijuana exports be given the highest priority. While
Lopez agreed to address the marijuana issue, he refused to adopt the
law enforcement measures advocated by Carter.4 As a result, Lopez
and Colombia suffered badly in the United States media and relevant
halls of the United States federal government."
Lopez' reaction to the Carter Administration's marijuana control
policy lends insight in regard to the differing perspectives of Colombia
and the United States toward the drug trafficking business. Professor
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Director of the Center of International Studies
at the University of the Andes in Bogota has written that,
during the [1970's] marijuana boom, [Colombian] policy was dom-
inated by a certain socioeconomic rationale, marked by a strong
vein of pragmatism. In fact, evidence of this can be found in sev-
eral manifestations: the creation of the so-called ventanilla sinies-
tra ([sinister] window) in the Banco de la Republica, which al-
lowed funds originating from drugs and other activities to enter the
country; the debates ...on legalization of drugs; the accept-
ance-albeit limited--of the new social sector associated with its
cultivation and marketing; and the government attitude.. that it
Revolutionary Workers Party).
Two powerful guerilla groups, FARC and ELN, continue to refuse to enter into
discussions with the government. Id. Moreover, throughout the twentieth century Co-
lombia has witnessed the proliferation of rightist, paramilitary "self-defense" groups.
See WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, COLOMBIA BESIEGED: POLITICAL VIO-
LENCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 59-83 (1989) [hereinafter WOLA].
43. Tokatlian, National Security and Drugs: Their Impact on Colombian-U.S.
Relations, 30 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 132, 142 (Spring 1988); see also
Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 70 (Fall 1988).
44. Tokatlian, supra note 43, at 142-43.
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not transfer unilaterally the cost of combatting the proliferating
consumption to Colombia. Clearly, in the 1970's the Colombian
system did not see itself seriously threatened by (1) the political
institutional reach of the marijuana business; (2) its negative effect
on national security; nor (3) the financial consequences of its pro-
duction and trade. Thus, Colombia did not accentuate, unilaterally,
repressive measures in its attempts to control and eradicate this
traffic. 5
In 1978, Liberal Party candidate Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala was
elected president of Colombia. Turbay was a proponent of increased
ties to the United States and upon assuming the presidency, he took a
number of steps to assure solidification of the Washington-Bogota
connection.
Because of the Colombian rural economy's poor state, and the ab-
sence of an effective welfare state, indigenous, rural-based "self protec-
tion" groups and labor unions such as the Asociacibn Nacional de
Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC) and the Consejo Regional Indigena del
Cauca (CRIC) had become quite active in the 1970s. These and other
organizations, including M-19,48 soon engaged in violence aimed at the
new Turbay Administration which was perceived as dedicated to the
preservation of the political status quo. Turbay had run his campaign
based on a restoration of "law and order,"'47 a code-phrase for repres-
sion of political opposition. To that end, just over a month after assum-
ing the presidency, Turbay, pursuant to his powers under the then ex-
isting state of siege, issued the Estatuto de Seguridad Nacional
(National Security Statute) .4 The Statute was similar to legislation
adopted by the military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Uru-
guay, and increased the authority of the president and the role of the
45. Id. at 139.
46. See supra note 42.
47. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 154-176.
48. DECRETO LEGISLATivo No. 1923 de 1978, No. 35101 Diario Oficial 1033
(21 de septiembre de 1978); Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 171 n.41. The
Statute suspended the right to habeas corpus and permitted the armed forces to arrest
civilians without formal charges. Id. In addition, it provided that civilians accused of
crimes against the national security would be tried in front of military tribunals, and it
replaced civilian government with military government in several localities throughout
the country. Id. (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL MISSION TO THm REPuBUic OF COLOMBIA (1980)); see also infra notes 71-83
and accompanying text.
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Colombian military in the operation of government. 49 Turbay used the
Statute as a vehicle to establish closer relations with the United States
and to obtain arms, military equipment, and military training.50
Additionally, in 1979, Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza Debayle was
overthrown by the leftist Frente Sandinista de Liberacibn Nacional
(FSLN). The displacement of Somoza, a wealthy landowner whose
family had ruled Nicaragua for most of the twentieth century, was
taken as a signal by Turbay whose family belonged to Colombia's elite,
and who was well aware of the strong leftist and populist guerilla
movements in his own country. Also, the new Nicaraguan government
disputed the territorial claims of Colombia to the San Andres Archipel-
ago.51 In response, Turbay requested protection from the United States.
In this connection, while the United States initially supported the
FSLN, by the time of Turbay's request, United States patience with
the new Nicaraguan government had waned because of the FSLN's
failure to "moderate" its militaristic, pro-Cuban stance. Thus, in the
outgoing Carter Administration and United States Congress, Turbay
had found a wealthy anti-Sandinista ally. With the advent of the fer-
vently anti-communist Reagan Administration in 1980, Bogota and
Washington would reach even firmer common ground. 52
Finally, and most importantly for instant purposes, in 1979 a re-
luctant Turbay signed the controversial United States-Colombia extra-
dition treaty.53 Because of the consistent flow of marijuana to the
United States from Colombia and Colombia's failure to seriously ad-
dress the problem, the Carter Administration had placed political pres-
sure on Turbay. The purpose of the pressure was to force Turbay to
choose between signing the 1979 Treaty or asking the United States for
49. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 171.
50. Id. While the Carter Administration expressed its willingness to assist
Turbay, it also expressed its concern regarding possible human rights abuses under the
Statute. Id. at 172.
51. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 157. The San Andres Archipelago is a
group of islands located off of the Nicaraguan coast, near the Golfo de los Mosquitos.
The largest two islands are San Andres and Providencia.
52. Id. at 159-161. For example, in response to Turbay's fears of Nicaraguan
"expansionism" into the San Andres, and, more to the point, to gain it stronger military
foothold in the area, the United States secretly negotiated with Colombia an agreement
to allow the United States to set up a military installation on San Anadres. Id; see also
Treaty with Colombia Concerning the Status of Quitasueno, Roncador, and Serrana,
Sept. 14, 1972, United States-Colombia, 33 U.S.T. 4459, T.I.A.S. No. 10316.
53. Treaty of Extradition, Sept. 14, 1979, United States-Colombia, (unnum-
bered) S. Treaty Doc. 8, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1979 Treaty].
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economic and military assistance without an illustration of Colombian
cooperation in helping the United States stem the flow of illicit drugs.
Just prior to Turbay's presidential victory in 1978, a report known as
the "Bourne Memorandum" had leaked from the White House." The
report accused Turbay and others in the upper echelons of Colombian
politics of having connections to groups involved in drug trafficking. 55
Despite an April 1979 report issued by the House Committee on Nar-
cotics Control and Abuse which concluded that Turbay was not in-
volved in drug trafficking,56 he was not entirely absolved of the taint of
corruption bestowed upon him by the Bourne Memorandum. Thus, to
gain political absolution and, therefore, economic and military assis-
tance, Turbay determined that it was in his administration's best inter-
ests to sign the 1979 Treaty.
2. The 1979 Treaty and The Palace of Justice Seizure
The 1979 Treaty went into force on March 4, 1982, and is one of
several extradition treaties negotiated by the United States between
1978 and 1983.7 Although each of the treaties negotiated within that
54. Bagley & Tokatlan, supra note 30, at 172 n.41.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 172 & n.44 (citing SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND
CONTROL, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FACT FINDING MISSION TO
COLOMBIA AND PUERTO Rico, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
57. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, 31
U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656; Treaty on Extradition, June 24, 1980, United States-
Netherlands, - U.S.T. . T.I.A.S. No. 10733; Supplementary Convention on
Extradition, March 14, 1983, United States-Sweden, - U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S.
No. 10812; Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 13, 1983, United States-Italy, - U.S.T.
. T.I.A.S. No. 10837; Treaty on Extradition, United States-Thailand, Dec. 14,
1983, S. Treaty Doc. No. 16, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Treaty on Extradition,
United States-Costa Rica, Dec. 4, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 17, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); Treaty on Extradition, United States-Jamaica, June 14, 1983, S. Treaty Doc.
18, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Treaty on Extradition, United States-Ireland, July 7,
1983, S. Treaty Doc. 19, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
These new extradition treaties illustrate important departures from the traditional
bilateral extradition treaties. For example, the new treaties expand significantly the
scope of the United States jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws, expressly in-
cluding acts of conspiracy. See, e.g., 1979 Treaty, supra note 53, at arts. 1-3. In addi-
tion, the treaties pick up on a trend first evidenced in the text of the multilateral 1933
Pan American Convention, supra note 27, expressly permitting extradition of the con-
tracting parties' citizens. While certainly unorthodox, the fact that this trend has con-
tinued in recently negotiated extradition treaties is not surprising in light of the advent
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period allows the extradition of the contracting parties' nationals, 58 the
relevant provision of the 1979 Treaty is notable for its specificity. Arti-
cle 8 grants the surrendering state's executive discretion in determining
whether a citizen of that state will be extradited, while simultaneously
requiring that extradition of nationals will be granted where "the of-
fense involves acts taking place in the territory of both States with the
intent that the offense be consummated in the Requesting State." 9
Clearly, this provision is meant to encompass acts by the surrendering
state's nationals which, under United States law, constitute conspira-
cies. Interestingly, the Letter of Submittal accompanying the 1979
Treaty specifically states that this "innovation . . . is especially impor-
tant in prosecuting exporters of dangerous drugs."60
Although the debate on the 1979 Treaty in the United States Con-
gress proceeded smoothly, the same cannot be said of the debate in the
Colombian Congress. The focus there was, of course, on article 8, the
text of which is considered by many Colombian politicians as an act of
submission to the United States and a violation of Colombian sover-
eignty."1 Despite the opposition, with the strong support of President
Turbay, the treaty bill was approved by both houses of the Colombian
Congress on October 14, 1980, and was sent to the President for
signature.
On November 3, 1980, Minister of Government Dr. German Zea
Hernandez, who had been delegated the exercise of presidential "con-
stitutional fuictions" by President Turbay while the latter was out of
the country on a state visit,62 signed the treaty bill and published it as
Law 27 of 1980.63 By the time the 1979 Treaty went into effect in
of modem communications technology which facilitates transnational crime, and when
read in connection with treaty provisions delineating the long arm of United States
criminal law.
58. See supra note 57.
59. 1979 Treaty, supra note 53, at art. 8(1)(a).
60. Letter of Submittal from State Department to White House, S. Treaty Doc.,
supra note 53, at vi.
61. Kavass, Introductory Note to Colombia: Supreme Court Decision on Law
Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between Colombia and the United States, 27
I.L.M. 492, 493 (1988).
62. See COLOM. CONST. art. 128.
63. Ley 27 de 1980, No. 35643 Diario Oficial 401 (14 de noviembre de 1980).
Notably, two other bilateral agreements were signed by the United States and Colom-
bia in 1980. First, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, the two governments
agreed to battle illicit traffic in narcotics. Narcotic Drugs: Cooperation to Curb Illegal
Traffic, July 21, Aug. 6, 1980, United States-Colombia, 32 U.S.T. 2301, T.I.A.S. No.
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March, 1982, Colombia was in the midst of a presidential campaign
with elections slated for May.
Ultimately, the Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur
Cuartas was elected President. Betancur's success marked the first
presidential victory for the Conservatives since the demise of the Na-
tional Front in 1974. Contrary to the political attitude of Turbay, who
was willing to push certain controversial domestic measures as a way of
currying favor with the United States, Betancur took a populist stance
and sought to cool relations between Bogota and Washington." In so
9838. This agreement comprises an offer and acceptance of $13,225,000 in United
States assistance for,
supplying and maintaining helicopters, patrol vessels, fixed radar equip-
ment, transport vehicles, and fuel, which shall be used exclusively for in-
terdicting drug traffic, for training personnel with respect to the interdic-
tion of drug traffic, and for whatever other purposes the United States
Congress may authorize.
Id. at 2302. Second, the two governments entered into a mutual legal assistance treaty.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Aug. 20, 1980, S.
Treaty Doe. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Each of these agreements is designed to
facilitate the purposes addressed by the 1979 Treaty, supra note 53.
In addition, in 1981, the United States Congress amended the Posse Comitatus
Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). The Act governs the use of the United States
military in foreign and domestic police actions involving illegal drugs, see Comment, A
Proposal for Direct Use of the United States Military in Drug Enforcement Opera-
tions Abroad, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291, 293 (1988) [hereinafter A Proposanl, and "pro-
hibits use of 'any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws except with authorization by the Constitution or Act of Congress." Id.
at 294. However, the 1981 amendments, codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-78, authorize
military officials to furnish information, equipment, facilities, training, and expert ad-
vice to civilian law enforcement personnel. A Proposal, supra, at 295. Such authoriza-
tion applies to both domestic and extraterritorial drug-oriented police work and has
been relied upon to justify the increasing use of the armed forces in drug interdiction
and eradication efforts. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 U.S. 142 (1986) (cited in A Proposal, supra, at 299 (naval support used
and approved of in extraterritorial drug interdiction)); Comment, The Extraterritorial
War on Cocaine: Perspectives from Bolivia and Colombia, 12 SuiF. TRANSNAT'L L.J.
39, 45-60 (1988) [hereinafter Bolivia and Colombia] (discussing use of United States
military in extraterritorial coca eradication); Isikoff, War On Drugs Mobilizes Na-
tional Guard, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (discussing National Guard's
escalating domestic role in assisting local police to identify suspected drug producers
and users, respectively); Isikoff, Interest in Grateful Dead Was Not Musical, Wash.
Post, Aug. 14, 1990, at A4, col. 1 (same).
64. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 176-186. For example, Betancur an-
nounced his intention to push for Colombia's membership in the Non-Aligned Move-
ment. Id. at 177. He also sought to revamp the Inter-American system following the
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doing, Betancur intentionally delayed executive action on extraditions
under the 1979 Treaty. The case of Colombian Carlos Lehder Rivas is
instructive on this point.65
Following his indictment in the United States on drug trafficking
charges in 1983, Carlos Lehder appealed to the SCJ from a lower
court's ruling in favor of his extradition under the 1979 Treaty. On
November 29, 1983, the SCJ affirmed the lower court's ruling and for-
warded the extradition request to the President for final resolution. De-
spite the SCJ's favorable ruling, it was not until June, 1984 that Presi-
dent Betancur handed down Resolution No. 101 permitting Lehder's
extradition." It is notable that Betancur's decision to permit Lehder's
extradition took place at a time when the Colombian economy was in a
shambles because of the worldwide recession of the early 1980's. As a
result, Betancur's political "honeymoon" was coming to a close and he
actively sought United States economic assistance. 67
divisive Falklands-Malvinas War. Id. at 178. In this regard, he supported the right of
Argentina to exercise sovereignty over the Islands. Id. Indeed, during a visit to Wash-
ington, Betancur's foreign minister criticized the United States for siding with Great
Britain and abandoning Latin America at a crucial moment. Id; see I*nter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 27, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 62
Stat. 1681. Finally, Betancur offered to restore relations with Cuba if that country
ceased its support of Colombian leftist insurgent groups. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra
note 30, at 179.
65. United States v. Lehder Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1623 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
66. Id. at 1524-25.
67. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 197-99, 202-204. During this period
(1984-85), Betancur was forced to adopt economic austerity measures to compensate
for Colombia's ever-expanding external debt. In turn, such austerity depended on stabi-
lization help from the United States in its roles as individual lender and member of the
International Monetary Fund and other international financial organizations. Id.
Other notable events in Colombian politics during this time pesriod included the
Uribe truce agreement signed with FARC on March 28, 1984, and approved by
Betancur on April 2, and, that same month, the murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla, allegedly the work of drug traffickers. Ultimately, after only a two year
hiatus, Betancur reintroduced martial law in May based on the Lare. assassination and
other violence attributed to members of the illicit drug business. See infra note 76.
On August 23-24, 1984, new truce agreements were signed between the govern-
ment, M-19, the Workers' Self-Defense Movement (ADO), and the EPL pending fur-
ther talks on political reform. The government/M-19 truce was short-lived, lasting less
than one year. M-19 justified its return to guerilla activity based on systematic viola-
tions committed by the Colombian army under the truce provisions, limitations on am-
nesty, failure of the government to implement basic political reforms, and the collapse
of dialogue. Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 201 n.103. Similar problems led to
the collapse of the government truce with the other guerilla groups.
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On November 5, 1985, the Palace of Justice, home of the SCJ,
Was seized by members of the M-19 guerilla group and a number of
hostages were taken, including members of the twenty-four justice
SCJ. While the reasons for the seizure are unclear,68 rather than at-
Also, during this time period, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.
L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2168, was enacted by the United States Congress. The Crime Con-
trol Act marked the first serious attempt by the United States to combat international
drug trafficking through penal legislation. In addition to its provisions regarding the
stemming of international currency flows connected to the illicit drug business, the Act
established the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, Pub. L. 98-473, § 1302, 98
Stat. 2168. The Board was charged with the duties of development and coordination of
a national drug enforcement policy, including international drug control. Id; Bolivia
and Colombia, supra note 63, at 44 n.30. Ultimately, the Board failed in its mandate
because it was unable to bring under control the turf battles raging among the myriad
federal governmental bureaucracies involved in the anti-drug effort. Id.
68. Clearly, the M-19 leadership was angry with the government's perceived fail-
ure to act in good faith under the August, 1984 truce agreement. See supra note 67.
By the 1984-85 period, Betancur had lost any control of government that he may have
had at the commencement of his presidency. Although Betancur was amenable to ne-
gotiation with the guerilla groups, other factions within the government were not so
willing. These factions, bolstered by Betancur's increasing unpopularity and his lame
duck status, ultimately prevailed. See Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 200-201.
In light of these events, M-19's frustration with the "formal" political and legal process
is understandable and provides one explanation for the takeover of the Palace of
Justice.
An alternative explanation for the seizure of the Palace of Justice has been of-
fered: that M-19 was paid by drug traffickers to enter the Palace and destroy the extra-
dition files. This explanation has been given some credence through the writings of
commentators. See, e.g., S. McDonald, supra note 10, at 37-39; Note, Nonconsensual
Military Action Against the Colombian Drug Lords Under the U.N. Charter, 68
WAsH. U.L.Q. 129, 132 (1990). Despite the absence of any hard evidence as to the
truth of the "narcoguerilla" theory in explaining the Palace of Justice seizure, some
may justify the theory's veracity on the basis of an explanation proffered by the United
States Department of Justice connecting the Colombian guerilla groups with drug traf-
fickers. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Drug Trafficking and Terror-
ism, 12 DRuG ENFORCEMENT 19 (Summer 1985).
The essence of the Justice Department's thesis is that in return for "protection"
provided to traffickers and producers by M-19 (formerly) and FARC, the traffickers
provide the groups with the means to support their respective causes. Id. at 19-21.
While the Justice Department theory rings true, it is true only in part. A deeper view
into the extent of the alleged trafficker-guerilla symbiosis reveals the weaknesses in the
"narcoguerilla" theory as the reason for M-19's seizure of the Palace of Justice.
The Justice Department theory does not imply that the groups work together or
are "friendly" to each other. Each group has its own agenda and will use any avenue
available to accomplish its goals. Indeed, according to the Justice Department, Colom-
bian guerilla groups are not "employed" by the traffickers. Rather, the relationship is
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tempt to negotiate the release of the hostages, the government decided
to send in the military. The November 6th battle resulted in the total
destruction of the Palace, and the deaths of the gueri.las and eleven
justices of the SCJ. Another justice was assassinated on July 31, 1986,
following which several others resigned.
Article 148 of the Constitution directs the remaining members of
the SCJ to fill vacancies created by death or resignation. 69 Neither ex-
ecutive nor legislative advice and consent is required or permitted. Ulti-
mately, by the end of 1986, a majority of the SCJ justices were new
appointees. Also by that time, Virgilio Barco Vargas had assumed the
presidency.70
extortionary in nature. Id. Interestingly, while there seems to some kind of business
relationship between rural-based guerilla groups such as FARC, ELN, and EPL and
the traffickers, the existence of an M-19/trafficker relationship is less evident. The rea-
son for this is that production and processing operations in Colombia take place in the
rural southeastern parts of the nation, areas controlled by FARC, ELN, and EPL.
These groups "share" the territory with the traffickers, levying a "tax" on them for
protection of shipments, laboratories, and growing areas. See Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control of the House of Representatives, Drugs and Latin
America: Economic and Political Impact and U.S. Policy Options, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Drugs and Latin America]. However, because M-19 was an
"urban" guerilla group and controlled no resources precious to the traffickers, there
was no reason for the traffickers to pay a "protection" tax. Thus, despite assertions to
the contrary by the Justice Department, there exists no evidence as to the existence of
a symbiotic relationship between M-19 and the traffickers. See Lee, The Cocaine Mo-
rass in South America, in Drugs and Latin America, id. at 119, 122.
In the final analysis, it is difficult to comprehend the stupidity of any group who
would pay for seizure of the Palace of Justice in an effort to destroy extradition "files."
Copies of such files exist not only at the Palace of Justice, but in the Colombian For-
eign Ministry and Justice Ministry as well.
69. COLOM. CoNsT. art. 148
70. During this period, the United States government enacted the most sweeping
narcotics control legislation in United States history. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). The Act advocated law enforcement in
drug-producing countries, increased interdiction, criminal penalties fbr money launder-
ing, establishment of grants to state and local enforcement agencies, and increases in
funding for treatment and rehabilitation programs. Id; Hogan & Doyle, supra note 1,
at 12.
Most important for purposes of the present analysis are the provisions of the 1986
Act which provide for the use of United States armed forces in -:he extraterritorial
enforcement of United States anti-drug criminal laws, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2012, 100
Stat. 3265-66 (use of Army in Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia); id. at § 3051, 100
Stat. 3274-76 (increased use of military in interdiction), and those: which tie foreign
assistance to the adequacy of anti-drug efforts taken by producing/trafficking nations,
id. at §§ 2005, 2008, 100 Stat. 3261-62, 64. These latter provisions are most pertinent
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III. THE RULE OF LAW IN COLOMBIA AND THE DELETERIOUS
EFFECT OF THE RECENT UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA
EXTRADITION RELATIONSHIP
A. States of Siege and Emergency Under the Colombian
Constitution
To understand the adverse effects of the United States interna-
tional drug control policy on the administration of justice in Colombia,
it is first necessary to understand that Colombia has been governed
under martial law almost continuously since La Violencia. Under the
Constitution, a state of siege or state of emergency may be declared by
a Colombian head of state where, with the concurrence of all cabinet
members, the head of state decides that "the public order has been
disturbed and that the whole or part of the republic is in a state of
siege,"71 or that events have taken place "which disturb or threaten
seriously and imminently to disturb the economic or social order of the
country or also constitute a serious public disorder.""2
to United States-Colombian relations. Essentially, these sections of the Act make for-
eign aid to drug-producing nations contingent upon certification by the President that
those nations are making adequate independent efforts to eradicate production and
trafficking or, alternatively, are adequately cooperating with the United States in its
eradication and enforcement efforts.
The clear intent of the United States in tying third world foreign aid directly to
certification is to force those nations to cooperate with United States drug control pol-
icy. However, the problem with such an incentive is its negative, coercive, and inher-
ently paternalistic nature. Indeed, the certification process has caused much consterna-
tion among third world governments attempting to cope with huge external debts and
guerilla insurgencies. Moreover, the certification process is susceptible to politicization.
The clearest case illustrating the politics of certification is that of Panama in the
1980's. Less than one year prior his indictments on charges of drug trafficking General
Manuel Antonio Noriega was praised by both then DEA Director Jack Lawn and the
United States Embassy in Panama for his efforts in illicit drug interdiction. See Com-
ment, An Inquiry Regarding the International and Domestic Legal Problems
Presented in United States v. Noriega, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 393, 403
(1989). It appears that the reason Panama was certified was due to its assistance of the
United States effort in arming and training the Nicaraguan contras. Id. at 402; see
also Bagley, Narco-Diplomacy: Drug Trafficking and U.S. Latin American Relations,
in Drugs and Latin America, supra note 68, at 76, 78-79 ("In 1987, . . . U.S. Con-
gressmen proposed to 'decertify' Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and the Bahamas, in
spite of the Reagan Administration's protests that such punitive measures would dam-
age U.S. relations with those countries . . . "').
71. COLOM. CONST. art. 121 (state of siege).
72. COLOM. CONST. art. 122 (state of emergency).
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State of siege and state of emergency powers allow the President
to issue executive decrees that have the same legally binding force as
congressional legislation passed under non-state of siege/emergency
conditions. Executive decrees issued during the state of siege/emer-
gency can amend laws previously enacted by Congress under the nor-
mal constitutional lawmaking regime, or can create entirely new laws.
Of course, executive decrees do not require or permit any action on the
part of the Congress. While executive decrees issued under the state of
siege/emergency are expressly subject to judicial review by the SCJ,'3
such review extends only to the procedure by which the executive de-
cree was introduced and does not touch upon its "merits."
73. COLOM. CONST. arts. 121, 122. A word of explanation is in order. Since 1886,
the Constitution has accorded the President state of siege powers. Findley, supra note
29, at 424. However, the state of emergency was not added to the Constitution until
the Constitutional Reform of 1968. Id. at 423-30. It seems that article 121 has been
resorted to by presidents to deal with disruptions not only in the "public order" (e.g.,
internal armed conflict) but in the public economic order caused by governmental in-
transigence and turf battling in economic planning. Id. at 423-27. Thus, to reduce ex-
ecutive reliance on the state of siege when Colombia was confronted with economic
problems, and thereby increase the role of the Congress and reinstitute democratic de-
cision making, article 122 was formulated. Id. at 427-30.
As originally envisioned by some members of the Colombian government, article
122 aimed to separate the concepts of economic disorder from political disorder. Id. at
452. The state of emergency, which could last no more than three months, was to be
invoked only where Colombia confronted an acute economic crisis (e.g., an abnormal
decline in national income due to sudden closing of foreign markets), as opposed to
situations where the government faced chronic economic problems (e.g., rural unem-
ployment or even a bloated external debt). Id. at 452-53. Despite the laudable inten-
tions of the government in implementing article 122, it soon became clear that the new
provision would be subjected to the same abuse as article 121, and that presidents
would quickly find non-economic reasons to invoke article 121.
For example, in September, 1974, one month after assuming office following Co-
lombia's first competitive presidential elections in twenty-six years, Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen indicated his intention of declaring a state of economic emergency under
article 122. Id. at 453. Lopez based his decision on a government deficit which
threatened to cut off salaries to government employees and suspend public programs.
Id. After 'the required nonbinding opinion was issued by the Council of State - Colom-
bia's highest level administrative tribunal - in favor of the declaration, Lopez finalized
his decision which limited the state of emergency to forty-five days,. Id. at 455 n.121
(citing Decreto 1970 of 1974). The legislative decrees issued thereur.der imposed a far-
reaching general tax reform package. Id. at 460-62. In 1976, Lopez declared a state of
siege for reasons of internal security. Id. at 473. Despite the Constitutional Reform of
1979, this state of siege lasted until lifted by President Turbay in July, 1982. Bagley &
Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 170 n.38.
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Under recent invocations of the state of siege, presidents have is-
sued decrees establishing trial of civilians by military tribunal,74 limit-
ing the jurisdiction of civilian courts, and altering basic constitutional
rights such as habeas corpus.75 During his tenure, under the current
state of siege imposed by President Betancur in 1984,78 Virgilio Barco
increased the power of the military and police in maintaining the public
order, diluting any demarkation that may have existed regarding their
different roles.77 Although Barco issued the decrees based on alleged
violence carried out by drug traffickers, much of the additional legal
firepower awarded to the military has been used to repress militant po-
litical opposition.
B. Martial Law and The Rule of Law in Colombia
A strict view of the rule of law is defined by application of "the
interrelated notions of neutrality, uniformity, and predictability."78
These notions must be promoted and reinforced through "differentia-
tion of the procedures of legislation, administration, and adjudica-
tion."79 In turn, popular participation in government legitimizes and
increases the power of each component because the legal order will "re-
present a balance struck among competing groups rather than the em-
bodiment of the interests and ideals of a particular faction."' 0 Con-
versely, the abdication of differentiation and the elimination of the
appearance of effective popular participation inevitably result in failure
of apparently neutral, uniform, and predictable application of the law
74. See, e.g., DEcRErO LEGIsLATIvo No. 2260 de 1976, No. 34676 Diario
Oficial 481 (17 de noviembre de 1976) (military tribunals imposed by President Lopez
under state of siege powers); see also DECRETO LEGISLAnrVO No. 1923 de 1978, supra
note 48 (National Security Statute issued by President Turbay imposing military tribu-
nals pursuant to state of siege powers). But see Decision of March 5, 1987 (Sala
Plena), 16 JURISPRUDENCIA Y DOCTRINA 492 (May 1987). In the March 5th Decision,
the SCJ declared unconstitutional the trial of civilians by military courts and restricted
presidential powers under martial law. Id.
75. See DEcRETo LEGISLArivO No. 1923 de 1978, supra note 48; see also
WOLA, supra note 42, at 87-106.
76. DEcRETo NUMERO 1038 de 1984, No. 36608 Diario Oficial 673 (14 de mayo
de 1984).
77. WOLA, supra note 42, at 88, 93-100.
78. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIErY 176 (1976).
79. Id. at 177.
80. Id. at 178.
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and, therefore, a breakdown in the rule of law."' This is exactly the
case in Colombia.
Because of the existence and cavalier invocation of the state of
siege/emergency powers, Colombia is a nation governed by executive
fiat rather than by democratic law. As a corollary, prevention of the
development of democratic practices has promoted violence and law-
lessness both within and without the government. Government institu-
tions are unable to assist Colombians in obtaining effective recourse.
The constant interference with legislative procedure and judicial inde-
pendence by Colombian heads of state, combined with close commiser-
ation between the executive branch, armed forces, and police has elimi-
nated respect for the rule of law by delegitimizing popular power.
The most recent invocation of the state of siege by President
Betancur in 198482 is based on a number of violent acts allegedly per-
petrated by participants in the drug trade. However, the inability of the
government to rule effectively under the normal constitutional regime
may have less to do with such violence than with the perceived threat
to the current political power structure posed by opposition groups, and
constraints imposed upon Colombia in its dealings with the United
States and the rest of the developed world.83
Regardless of the reasons for its invocation, the carrent state of
siege enabled former President Barco to effectively disable the Colom-
bian judiciary. Despite recent SCJ rulings affecting extradition, the ex-
ecutive ultimately has chosen to go its own way. Thus, redress through
the Colombian courts for anyone subject to extradition is no longer an
option.
C. The SCJ Decisions of December 12, 1986 and June 25, 1987
1. The December 12, 1986 Decision
On December 12, 1986 the SCJ handed down the initial decision
81. I write here of "appearance" because it has been argued effectively, particu-
larly by Legal Realists and adherents to the Critical Legal Studie; Movement, that
even in societies where differentiation and widespread public participation take place,
the transformative effect of such participation is limited, and application of the law in a
truly neutral, uniform, and predictable manner is mythical. See generally Blum, Criti-
cal Legal Studies and the Rule of Law, 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 59 (1990).
82. See DECRETO NUMERO 1038, supra note 76.
83. See Bagley & Tokatlian, supra note 30, at 202-204.
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regarding the enforceability of the law containing the 1979 Treaty.84
Despite statements in previous Court opinions that it was prevented by
the separation of powers doctrine from ruling on the constitutionality of
public treaties (i.e., a broad political question doctrine), the Court re-
versed itself, basing its jurisdiction on article 214(2) of the Colombian
Constitution.85
A unanimous SCJ held that Law 27 was unconstitutional because
the President had not signed it.88 The Court reasoned that approval of
the law by a cabinet minister acting as president has no legal effect
because the delegation of presidential power under which he was acting
does not include conducting international relations.87 Such activity is of
a political nature which requires "the personal use of presidential pre-
rogative as the head of state."88 The delegation of presidential power
includes only the administrative functions of the office. Thus, without
the signature of the head of state, a law containing a treaty between
Colombia and another state is unenforceable under the Constitution.
It is notable that the Colombian Constitution contains no provision
distinguishing between the "political and administrative responsibilities
of the President or requiring the former to be exercised personally by
him."8 9 Thus, the SCJ's holding was one of inference derived from the
Constitution's text. However, the SCJ decision was reinforced by the
concurring opinion of the House of Representatives-appointed Attorney
General. 90
2. The June 25, 1987 Decision
In light of the SCJ's reasoning in its December 12th decision that
Law 27 was procedurally defective because of the absence of then Pres-
84. See Kavass, supra note 61, at 495 (discussing the Decision of December 12,
1986 (Sala Plena)).
85. COLOM. CoNsT. art. 214(2) (stating that "the Court shall have the ...
power: [t]o decide definitively on the legality of all laws and decrees issued by the
government ... when they are brought before the Court upon allegation of unconstitu-
tionality by any citizen.").
86. Kavass, supra note 61, at 495.
87. Id. at 496; see COLOM. CONST. art 128.
88. Kavass, supra note 61, at 496.
89. Id.
90. Under article 214(2) of the Constitution, the Attorney General is required to
render, prior to the Court's review of the case, an opinion in all cases involving chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of laws. COLOM. CONST. art. 214(2).
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ident Turbay's signature, President Barco attempted to cure the defect
by signing the original bill containing the 1979 Treaty, and promulgat-
ing it as Law 68 of 1986.91 Of course, Law 68 was immediately chal-
lenged and came before the SCJ in May, 1987.
The basis of the challenge to the new law was that, in signing Law
27 of 1980 and promulgating it as Law 68 of 1986, the President had
approved a law that did not exist. The SCJ Decision of December 12,
1986, while based on procedural grounds, invalidated the whole of Law
27 of 1980, therefore requiring the reintroduction of the bill to Con-.
gress, and congressional debate on and passage of the new bill. Because
these steps had not been accomplished, the President's promulgation of
Law 68 had no constitutional basis. The legislative process had been
violated.
In the Court's decision, twelve of the twenty-four SCJ justices
agreed that the Court's December 12th decision rendered Law 27 com-
pletely invalid.92 These justices reasoned that the various steps of the
legislative process described under the Constitution (i.e., legislative de-
bate, passage, and presidential approval/objection) mus: be viewed as a
single unit.93 While the Court did not, specifically allude to separation
of powers or "checks and balances," one can discern from its reasoning
that such a process was indeed what the Court had in mind. In other
words, where the legislature and executive fulfill functi.ons in the law-
making process, each of their respective functions must be subject to
the oversight of the other because of the inherently political nature of
both branches. Thus, any flaw in the lawmaking proces must be con-
sidered fatal if that process is to retain its legitimacy. If one lawmaking
branch makes a "mistake" in the process and is then allowed on its
own to "fix" its mistake, such an allowance gives the appearance of
removal of the oversight "check" of the other lawmaking branch
thereby ceding too much power to the former. In this regard, the opin-
ion of the first twelve-justice plurality is an interpretation of the Con-
stitution's text delineating the legislative process, prior cases dealing
with the same subject, and scholarly inquiry relevant lo the process. 94
The other twelve SCJ justices disagreed, holding that the SCJ's
December 12th decision invalidated Law 27 only insofar as it was not
91. Ley 68 de 1986, No. 37733 Diario Oficial 1 (14 de diciembre de 1986).
92. See Kavass, supra note 61, at 498 (reprint of Decision of June 25, 1987
(Sala Plena)).
93. See id. at 501.
94. See id. at 502.
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properly approved by the President, and that proper approval of the
law would remedy the procedural defect. This twelve-justice plurality
reasoned that because the December 12th Court's reasoning in the
"grounds" section of the decision was so specific as to why Law 27 was
unenforceable, "[t]he Court believed that the bill was consistent with
the Constitution as regards the legislative phase and that all that was
lacking was the presidential approval so that it could become a law
. . ,"I In other words, if it was the Court's intention to send the bill
back to Congress, it would not have been so specific in the grounds for
its decision. Thus, according to the second plurality of justices, the
Court stated the legislation's defect and prescribed the cure. The sec-
ond group of justices went on to give an expansive interpretation of the
Constitution's Article 86, arguing that the President can apprve and
promulgate a bill at any time after expiration of the time periods pre-
scribed for objection.98
Alfonso Suarez de Castro, the temporary justice appointed to
break the tie, sided with the first plurality.97 He noted that under Arti-
cle 2 of Law 1 of 1873, laws must be numbered consecutively in the
year they come through the Congress, and are sent to the President. 8
In this regard, executive approval is not considered in determining the
year that a law was enacted.99 Thus, because Congress did not enact
Law 68 of 1986, it does not satisfy the requirements of Law 1 of 1873,
and satisfies only one requirement of the Constitution's Article 81.100
Therefore, Law 68 must be unconstitutional.
Justice Suarez then addressed the apparent interpretational con-
flict among the Court stemming from the December 12th Court's speci-
ficity in describing the "grounds" for its decision and the statement in
the "operative" portion of the decision declaring Law 27 unenforceable.
Justice Suarez stated that the view expressed by the Court in its
"grounds" section is relevant only to the extent that it enunciates the
basis of the Court's ultimate decision. He reasoned that under the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine embodied in the Constitution, the Court, like
the legislature, is prohibited from making suggestions to public offi-
95. Id. at 509.
96. Id. at 510-11.
97. Kavass, supra note 61, at 505-506 (opinion of temporary Associate Justice
Alfonso Suarez de Castro).
98. Id. at 506.
99. Id.
100. COLOM. CONST. art. 81 (describing legislative process).
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cials,' 01 and that the remaining procedure by the President could not be
completed under Article 86 because of the expiration of the constitu-
tional time periods for legally executing them.l0 2 Therefore, the opera-
tive part of the Court's decision was tied to a very specific grounds
section is not restrictive because the grounds merely indicate the deter-
mining conditions-in essence, the cause or causes--of the unenforce-
ability of Law 27.108
Of all the reasons given by temporary Associate Justice Suarez,
the first seems the most powerful because it militates against the issu-
ance of advisory opinions. In turn, such reasoning goes hand-in-hand
with the first plurality's separation of powers or checks and balances
analysis.' 4 For the same reason, Justice Suarez's conclusion is also
quite strong. While Justice Suarez second reason appears weak because
Article 86 of the Constitution prescribes time limitations; only for presi-
dential objection to bills,105 it gains strength when read in conjunction
with his interpretation of the law numbering process. The ultimate ef-
fect of the SCJ's June 25, 1987 decision was to render the 1979 Treaty
unenforceable in Colombia. Suspension of all extraditions under the
1979 Treaty soon followed.
D. Decree Number 1860
Not until August, 1989 would extraditions resume. Why the two
year hiatus? It is hard to say specifically, but it is worth noting that the
summer of 1987 was not particularly good for the Reagan Administra-
tion because it was the summer of the Iran-Contra congressional in-
quiry. Later, United States Attorney General Edwin Meese resigned
and was replaced by Richard Thornburgh. By the time the Thornburgh
Justice Department got going, then Vice President George Bush was
101. Kavass, supra note 61, at 507 (opinion of temporary Afsociate Justice Al-
fonso Suarez de Castro); see also COLOM. CONST. art. 78.
102. Kavass, supra note 61, at 507.
103. Id.
104. See COLOM. CONST. art. 78(1) (forbidding Congress to make suggestions to
public officials); accord H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 66-68 (2d ed. 1973) (discussing the seminal 1793 'United States advi-
sory opinion case known as the "Correspondence of the Justices" in which the Supreme
Court refused to issue such an opinion to the Washington Administration, reasoning
that the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances prevented the Court
from doing so).
105. COLOM. CONsT. art. 86.
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hot on the presidential campaign trail, as were a number of members of
Congress and Senators. All of this served to push to the rear of the
priority list renewed pressure on Colombia to resume extradition of sus-
pected drug traffickers to the United States. However, the advent of the
Bush Administration in 1989, with its emphasis on increased law en-
forcement to reduce international drug trafficking, was all that was
needed to bring the extradition issue back to the forefront.10 8
A rather reluctant President Barco was left with four options in
reviving extradition: His first option was to defy Washington's request.
However, in light of his personal ties to the United States and the per-
ceived importance of United States economic and military assistance,
that option was simply not viable. His second option was to reintroduce
to Congress a bill containing the 1979 Treaty. However, because of the
congressional opposition to the 1979 Treaty expressed during the initial
debate in 1980 and the hostility toward extradition of Colombian na-
tionals that had developed within the Colombian populace, Barco knew
that the odds were against passage of a new bill. As a third option,
Barco could have sought either encourage adoption of the Inter-Ameri-
can Treaty on Extradition,'0 7 or renegotiation of the 1979 Treaty, de-
leting or restricting the provision allowing for extradition of Colombian
nationals. The problem there was that it was precisely that provision
which had been so strongly advocated by the United States during the
initial negotiations. s08 Thus, there was little chance that the Bush Ad-
ministration would support a Colombian request to restrict or delete
such substantive language. Ultimately, Barco chose his fourth option:
issuance under his state of siege powers of a legislative decree mandat-
ing "administrative" extradition.
The popular view in some sectors of Colombian society and in the
106. Note that in 1988, the United States passed a sweeping anti-narcotics law
known as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
The law created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (the "Drug Czar") to
coordinate all drug control efforts and required the President to formulate and submit
to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy. Pub. L. 100-690, §§ 1001, 1005, 102
Stat. 4181, 4185. The Bush Administration, the campaign platform of which included
a strong anti-drug crime plank, was quick in its response. The National Drug Control
Strategy, emphasizing extraterritorial law enforcement, soon became a major political
tool. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 49-63 (1990); see
also Perl, International Aspects of U.S. Drug Control Efforts, CRS REv. 17 (Nov.-
Dec. 1989).
107. See supra note 27.
108. See 1979 Treaty, supra note 53.
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United States was that President Barco issued Decree Number 1860 of
1989,109 providing for summary administrative extradition of those ac-
cused of drug trafficking, in response to the August 14 assassination of
Liberal presidential candidate Carlos Luis Galn. Of course, Galdn's
murder was alleged to have been committed by agents of drug traffick-
ers. According to the conventional wisdom, the Decree would be a sign
from the Barco Administration that it was serious about dealing with
those involved in the drug trade, and that it would not tolerate mass
bloodshed allegedly perpetrated by traffickers.
The problem here is that there are other well-informed and well-
connected members of Colombian society who relate a much different
story underlying the promulgation of D.N. 1860, a story much less al-
truistic and far more disturbing than the "official" version. The Bush
Administration's strong emphasis of a law enforcement.-oriented inter-
national drug control policy makes such an alternative view, plausible.
Faced with the fact that the Colombian Congress was not about to
approve a new bill containing the 1979 Treaty, in late spring or early
summer of 1989 members of the Colombian Executive Cabinet, in con-
sultation with members of the United States Department: of Justice and
the foreign ministries of certain European nations, devised the language
that was to become the text of D.N. 1860. However, because of the
then strong, anti-extradition feeling within Colombia, a pretext for is-
suance of the Decree was necessary-a pretext that would sufficiently
shock the Colombian people into backing extradition of Colombian na-
tionals. The death of Galdn, a vocal critic of drug traffickers, provided
such a pretext. His murder remains a mystery and Colombian authori-
ties have yet to uncover any evidence that it was carried out by sicarios
(professional assassins) in the traffickers' employ.
Certainly, in light of the alleged business acumen ;and complexity
of those involved in the illicit drug business, the lack of evidence does
not, in itself, mean that the drug trade had nothing to do with the
GaIn assassination. However, the official story simply does not com-
port with the strong Colombian popular feeling against extradition of
nationals in effect at the time of Galdn's death. It makes absolutely no
sense that members of the illicit drug business would commit such a
poorly timed assassination of a popular leader. Indeed, if drug traffick-
109. DECREMTO NtJMERO 1860 de 1989, No. 38945 Diario Oficial 5 (18 de agosto
de 1989) [hereinafter D.N. 1860 or "the Decree"]; see also DECRIrrO NuMERo 2105
de 1989, No. 38981 Diario Oficial 4 (14 de setiembre de 1989) (providing for personal
appearance of defendant during extradition proceedings). ,
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ers are considered to be sophisticated business people, how could they
have been foolish enough to kill a popular politician when things were
so much in their favor? They must have known that killing Galdn
would have resulted in a Colombian change of heart and a government-
led crackdown. If nothing else, such a move would be "bad for
business."
In any event, D.N. 1860 was in force. Although disturbed by the
new administrative summary extradition procedure, the majority of the
Colombian populace was caught sufficiently off-guard by the Galdn as-
sassination and the official story to deter a major political backlash.
D.N. 1860 is a severe measure. It was enacted by President Barco
pursuant to the state of siege that his predecessor had invoked in
1984.110 D.N. 1860 is designed to provide for summary administrative
extradition of those who participate in the narcotics business.111 Article
1 suspends subsection 2, Article 17 of the Penal Code "with regard to
everything related to narcotics trafficking and related crimes ....
Subsection 2 of Article 17 of the Penal Code provides that extradition
of Colombians "shall be subject to the provisions of public treaties."' 13
While the legislative intent of this provision is difficult to discern, one
can deduce that its wording provides a safeguard against the extradi-
tion of Colombian nationals by pure executive fiat. In other words, be-
cause extradition of Colombian citizens is to take place only within the
ambit of duly negotiated public treaties, and because all public treaties
are subject to congressional legislation, the executive is prevented from
extraditing nationals without congressional consultation.1 1
4
110. See supra note 76.
111. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at Preamble.
112. Id. at art. 1.
113. CODIGO PENAL DE COLOMBIA art. 17, § 2, reprinted in REGIMEN PENAL
CoLoMBIANo (loose-leaf 1990).
114. A review of the history of Colombia's policy on extradition of its own citi-
zens reinforces this point. From the year of the nation's independence until 1936, extra-
dition of nationals was, at least, not expressly prohibited by law. However, note that
such extradition was discouraged under the 1888 extradition convention with the
United States. See 1888 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 10. In 1936, Law 95 was
enacted as part of the Penal Code, and expressly forbade extradition of citizens. It was
only in 1980, during the war on marijuana by the United States, and during the Wash-
ington-oriented Turbay Administration, that extradition of nationals was expressly per-
mitted. In that year, President Turbay issued Decree Number 100, amending the Penal
Code to its current form allowing for extradition of Colombian nationals, but only
where such extradition is made pursuant to public treaties. Clearly, this decree was a
response to the newly negotiated 1979 Treaty, supra note 53, which called for extradi-
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Article 2 of D.N. 1860 eliminates the requirement of a "prior rul-
ing by the Criminal Appeals Division of the Supreme Court of Justice"
in the granting of extradition requests for Colombian citizens and for-
eign nationals. 115 Under prior practice, requests for extradition were
subject to judicial review to assure that such requests were being made
in accordance with Colombian law.
Article 3 places those persons "held or arrested and subject to ex-
tradition" at the disposal of the Justice Ministry.' Article 5 provides
that an extradition request will preempt any conviction for another
crime of the requested person already obtained in Colombia prior to
the receipt of the extradition request."1 7 In other words, if a requested
person is already serving jail time in Colombia pursuant to a prior con-
viction, the Government may still "order the immediate delivery of
th[at] person . . . to the requesting State . . ." for trial in that state
on the charges upon which the extradition is based." 8
Article 6 provides that "any person may be extradited, although
the person may have been tried in Colombia for the same crime for
which he is requested, as long as sentence has not been rendered.""' ,,
Thus, it is possible for a person to be tried twice for the same crime,
albeit in different jurisdictions. Article 7 denies both the right to re-
lease on bail and the ability to obtain a suspended sentence to re-
quested persons against whom "other proceedings" are in progress in
Colombia. 2 0
Article 8 is very important, because it outlines the requirements
for the granting of an extradition request. Section A requires the re-
questing state to guarantee that the death penalty will not be imposed
upon the person extradited.' 2 ' Section B states that "[t he extradition
of a citizen shall not be granted in any case where the requesting State
does not fully guarantee that it shall not impose a term of imprison-
ment of more than thirty (30) years. 122 Section C provides that the
requesting State shall "guarantee that the human rights of the person
extradited shall be respected . . . in a manner that is non-discrimina-
tion of the contracting parties' nationals.
115. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at art. 2.
116. Id. at art. 3.
117. Id. at art. 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at art. 6.
120. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at art. 7.
121. Id. at art 8, § A.
122. Id. at art. 8, § B.
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tory with regard to those convicted in its own country."1 23 Section D
provides that all costs of extradition (i.e., translation of documents and
transportation of the person extradited) shall be borne by the request-
ing state.1 24
Article 9 provides that the Government may issue a resolution in
favor of extradition in absentia. 25 In other words, the person requested
does not have to be "the object of detention or arrest" for a favorable
extradition resolution to be issued.1 26 However, in such a case, the Gov-
ernment is required to issue a "summons" to the person requested so
that the person may prepare a defense.
Ultimately, the promulgation of D.N. 1860 not only bypassed the
constitutional legislative process, but proscribed any kind of indepen-
dent judicial due process. By providing for extradition proceedings to
be carried out exclusively by the executive branch, D.N. 1860 leaves
much leeway for abuse of the requested person's civil rights. Essen-
tially, under the Decree, Colombia can extradite anyone it wants as
long as there is some type of illegal drug-related charge pending
against that person in the requesting state.
E. The SCJ Decision of October 3, 1989
The question of the constitutionality of D.N. 1860 came before the
SCJ in September, 1989, and the Court rendered its opinion on Octo-
ber 3.127 It began its opinion on the subject matter of D.N. 1860 by
recognizing the power of the President, under his state of siege power,
to amend the law when he believes that the public order is threatened.
Thus, the Court agreed that, on its face, Article 1 of the Decree, sus-
pending the section of the Penal Code restricting extradition of Colom-
bians to duly negotiated public treaties, was constitutional.
The SCJ then examined the Decree in the context of previous de-
cisions dealing with international extradition and international agree-
ments on extradition to which Colombia is a party and which are cur-
rently in force. The Court seemed particularly concerned with that part
of the Penal Code which D.N. 1860 left intact, to wit: that extradition
123. Id. at art. 8, § C.
124. Id. at art. 8, § D.
125. D.N. 1860, supra note 109, at art. 9.
126. Id.
127. Decision of October 3, 1989 (Sala Plena) (unofficial translation; on file at
the offices of the Nova Law Review).
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shall be granted, requested, or offered in accordance with public trea-
ties. The SCJ stated:
[T]he circumstance that the extradition of nationals for drug traf-
ficking and kindred crimes is now possible, even in the absence of a
public treaty authorizing it, does not in any way imply that if such
international instruments exist they should not be observed, inas-
much as, quite the contrary, it is imperative for both concerned
states that they be performed with exactness, for the bona fides
required of them is at stake. This conclusion, which goes hand in
hand with a literal as well as a systematic construction of the rules,
is unescapable [sic]. 128
Looking to its previous decisions both en banc and in its Criminal
Appeals Division, the Court held that under basic principles of interna-
tional law, despite the presence of conflicting domestic 1.egislation, Co-
lombia remains bound by its international obligations.1 29 This is the
rule in the United States as well."' 0
The SCJ attempted to draw distinctions among what it character-
ized as two of the three classes of international treaties: "contract"
treaties and "law" or "normative" treaties. According t:o the Court, a
contract treaty,
creates reciprocal rights and obligations between the parties which
are, therefore, the reason for mutual performance by the very
states that execute them; in this regard, they are subjective acts or
the source of legal relations of that nature; they settle different,
albeit not always contradictory or opposing, interests of the parties,
and their common will leads to the resolution of each such interest.
By contrast, law treaties or normative treaties regulate issues of
concurrent or shared interest and determine, not the behavior of
each state vis-A-vis the other's rights and obligations, but rather the
behavior that each state must observe in a certain matter, thus giv-
ing rise to objective law."3'
128. Id. at 9.
129. Id. at 10; see also VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, Nov.
22, 1971, S. Exec. Doc., 92d Cong., 1st sess., art. 27 (1971); Kearney & Dalton, The
Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115(1)(b), comments (a), (b) (1987).
131. Decision of October 3, supra note 127, at 10-11.
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Extradition treaties fall under the former category because such
treaties involve regulation of "a [contracting] state vis-A-vis another in
terms of mutual performance and on the international field, '132 while
treaties governing, say, intellectual property, fall under the latter cate-
gory because such treaties "determine the internal conduct of the [con-
tracting] states in transnational matters (international private law)
. . . .,x Because contract treaties, such as those involving extradition,
govern relations purely between states acting as legal persons, "the[ir]
prevalence . . . cannot even be doubted .*.". .""' Thus, in the pres-
ence of an extradition treaty, the contracting parties may not accord
preferential application to internal legislation on the same subject. Ulti-
mately, the 1979 Treaty, while dormant under Colombian law because
of the SCJ's 1987 decision, is still in force under international law until
it is denounced. Therefore, the 1979 Treaty takes precedence over D.N.
1860.135
Despite the October 3, 1989 decision by the SCJ, the Colombian
government, with the approval of the United States, has continued to
extradite both its nationals and noncitizens under D.N. 1860. There
has been no formal denunciation of the 1979 Treaty either by Colom-
bia or the United States as provided in Article 21 of the 1979 Treaty,
and by the rules under article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: a convention to which both nations are signatories. Thus,
under both countries' laws, the legal status of the 1979 Treaty, and the
extraditions which have taken place pursuant to D.N. 1860, have yet to
be resolved.
More poignantly, the Colombian government's refusal to abide by
the SCJ's declaration of D.N. 1860's subordinance to the 1979 Treaty
is indicative of its low regard for the authority of Colombia's highest
court and the pointlessness of SCJ decisions issued during a state of
siege. Equally disconcerting is the role that the United States has
played. Rather than implementing a policy focused on institution build-
ing which aims to reinforce the rule of law in Colombia, the United
States' policy contributes to its deterioration by actively promoting
debilitation of an independent Colombian judiciary and disrespect for
the Constitution.
It is quite clear that current administration of justice in Colombia
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 11-12.
135. Id. at 13.
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is carried out not by the judicial system pursuant to its constitutional
mandate, but solely by executive discretion. Thus, despite both the
"free and fair" presidential elections of 1990- the campaign which saw
the assassination of three candidates - and the absence of direct mili-
tary rule, Colombian democracy, governed according to the rule of law,
remains a fiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the United States and Colombia are serious about reducing the
volume of international drug trafficking emanating from Colombia and
restoring order in that country, they must endeavor to make the busi-
ness less attractive. The current international drug control policy of the
United States, and active participation in that policy by the Colombian
government, verges on the perpetration of fraud3 6 and has solidified
Colombia's status as a police state. Rather than addressing some of the
causes of Colombia's role as a base for drug trafficking: extreme pov-
erty in that country; corruption in the highest echelons of Colombian
society and government; and high demand for illicit drugs in the devel-
oped world, to name three, the current policy has only increased the
level of violence in an already violent society. To defuse the situation,
and this can occur only gradually, the rule of law must be established
in Colombia, thereby giving Colombians some sort of recourse other
than violence. That process can be initiated through a number of steps.
First, Colombia must amend its constitution to eliminate the state
of siege/emergency powers of the President. These powers have been
abused by Colombian heads of state who seem to prefer armed repres-
sion of political opposition to true competition, negotiation, and prob-
lem solving. The Colombian President's invocation of the state of siege/
emergency powers robs the rule of law of all meaning.137 If the state of
siege/emergency powers are not eliminated, all other efforts to restore
136. See supra notes 12, 13.
137. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. Indeed, the practical effect
of the state of siege regarding the independence of the judiciary,
is to reduce considerably the judiciary's sphere of action in protecting con-
stitutional rights from governmental abuse. Consequently, long-term usage
of the state of siege or its functional equivalents has substantially hindered
judicial independence in many Latin American countries by making pro-
tection of constitutional rights impossible.
Rosenn, Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. Rv. 1,
34 (1987).
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the rule of law will be for nought. In this regard, Colombia must break
with its authoritarian past.138 The government must exhibit the politi-
cal will to allow the judicial system to carry out its function as an invi-
olable branch of government with the power to overrule actions taken
by the Executive and Congress when either of those two branches over-
138. In light of Latin American political history in general, this appears to be a
tall order. Indeed, some knowledgeable commentators on Latin American law have in-
dicated that the trend toward authoritarian government in Latin America is a cultur-
ally natural and "not accidental" phenomenon, reflecting "the Roman law tradition of
granting autocratic powers to the emperors and paterfamilias, the corporativism and
patrimonialism of colonial rule, and the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church."
Rosenn, supra note 137, at 34 (citing Wiarda, Toward a Framework for the Study of
Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition" The Corporate Model, 25 WORLD POL.
206, 210-12 (1973); Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin America, 19 AM.
J. Corp. L. 434, 438-47 (1971)).
Unwilling to accept such analysis as the final word on democratic evolution in
Latin America, other specialists have attempted to provide an answer. For example,
Carlos Santiago Nino, Professor of Law at the University of Buenos Aires, writes that,
[a]s for the alleged Hispanic preference for strong leaders, this tendency
should be institutionally counteracted rather than promoted. In fact, the
postulation is rather dubious, given the easy adaptation of countries like
Spain to a parliamentary system (after forty years of a caudillo's rule),
and the adoption of strong leaders by non-Hispanic nations.
Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin
America, 44 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 129, 155 (1989). Professor Nino's attempt to dispel the
culturally linked Latin American authoritarian governmental model is laudable but un-
satisfying. It is laudable because it refutes a stereotype often bestowed upon Hispanic
culture. However, it is unsatisfying for three reasons. First Professor Nino fails to ac-
knowledge the differences among continental Spanish and Latin American cultures
which may have influenced Spain's transition from military rule to parliamentary de-
mocracy and which may prevent many Latin American nations from doing so, includ-
ing the influence of other democratic European nations on Spain because of geographic
proximity, Spain's membership in the European Community, and her membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Second, Professor Nino fails to admit that
even Spain experiences problems similar, albeit to a much lesser extent, to those of
many Latin American nations, to wit: difficulty in controlling the police in some parts
of the country, occasional coup attempts by the military, and the existence of separatist
insurgent groups such as the Basques.
Finally, Professor Nino's argument that non-Hispanic nations have adopted strong
leaders does not in itself effectively counter the cultural linkage argument. Rather,
such an argument merely indicates that culture is not the only reason underpinning the
rise of authoritarianism. Perhaps this strand of Professor Nino's reasoning can be
strengthened by comparing the seemingly similar problems of post-colonial Latin
America and post-colonial Africa and Asia. See Africa's Cities, Tim ECONOMIST 25
(Sept. 15, 1990); Crosette, In Pakistan, The Judiciary Tries to Keep an Even Keel,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, at D4, col. 1.
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steps its constitutional mandate.
Second, the United States and Colombia should immediately cease
all extraditions taking place under D.N. 1860, and the Colombian gov-
ernment should either reintroduce the 1979 Treaty to Congress, de-
nounce it, and enter into new bilateral negotiations, or denounce it and
insist on adoption of the Inter-American Treaty on Extradition.3 9 New
bilateral extradition treaty negotiations must take into account Colom-
bia's sensitivity in protecting its sovereignty and culture, and must rein-
force other aspects of a Colombian program to institute and effectuate
the rule of law. In this regard, if a new treaty is negotiated, prosecution
and incarceration of Colombian citizens accused of drug-related crimes
should take place in Colombia. Extradition of Colombians to the
United States should occur, if ever, only in certain clearly defined and
closely monitored cases. 140
Third, the United States must refrain from using negative incen-
tives in determining whether Colombia will receive economic assis-
tance. 4 Rather, the United States, the European Community, and Ja-
pan, under the auspices of international organizations, must positively
assist Colombia economically, and in reforming and rebuilding its judi-
cial system. 42 Military and economic assistance should be made con-
tingent on a Colombian commitment to such reformation and recon-
struction.'43 The developed nations might even earmark aid for specific
projects. For example, the United States, the European Community, or
139. See supra note 27.
140. Currently, this is not the case under D.N. 1860, supra note 109. See supra
notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 67, 70.
142.. A primary form of economic assistance should, of course, consist of trade
credits and preferences negotiated under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade.
Such credits and preferences should be targeted at Colombia's three most attractive
exports: Coffee, fossil fuels, and cut flowers. With regard to coffee, by far the nation's
largest export, the International Coffee Agreement, Dec. 3, 1975. 28 U.S.T. 6403,
T.I.A.S. No. 8683, which collapsed in July, 1989, should be renegotiated. See OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990 TRADE PoLIcY AGENDA AND
1989 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 66-70 (1990).
143. Whether or not the new government of Cesar Gaviria Trujilo is prepared to
make such a commitment remains to be seen. However, there is some indication that
effective judicial reform is possible. See "Urge Reforma de la Justicta:" Pinzon Lopez,
El Espectador (Colombia), July 13, 1990 at 6A, col. 1 (testimony of former SCJ Jus-
tice and Labor Minister Jaime Pinzon Lopez regarding necessity of judicial reform to
restore order in Colombia).
[Vol. 15
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/10
Sherman
Japan could donate computer systems to be used by the Colombian
courts, and could train Colombian court personnel in the use of such
systems. In response, Colombia would agree to dedicate a substantial
amount of its budget to appropriations aimed at hiring and training
more judicial personnel, raising the desperately low salaries of judges
and rank and file police and corrections personnel, and purchasing
modern equipment for the courts. The Colombian government would
also agree to effectively separate the duties of the military from those
of the police.
Fourth, Colombia must seek to implement a social safety net that
provides realistic upward opportunities for its large, poor population.
Under the current system, such opportunities are non-existent, and
"rank" in society is determined at birth."," By changing the caste sys-
tem, Colombia will increase the alternatives available to the urban and
rural poor, thereby decreasing the attractiveness of the drug business.
Finally, the United States, Western European states, and Japan
must increase their emphasis on drug demand reduction. By engaging
in demand reduction, these nations, the largest consumers of cocaine,
will eliminate the economic incentive involved in the international drug
trafficking business.
The author recognizes that these suggestions challenge certain Co-
lombian cultural norms, as well as a United States policymaking pro-
cess which gives great weight to short term results reflected in opinion
polls. Long term policymaking obtains results which can be measured
only over a substantial period of time. However, only through such fun-
damental changes in thinking can the rule of law be implemented in
Colombia, and international drug trafficking be reduced significantly
without civil and human rights sacrificed and lives lost.
144. See generally INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEv., COLOMiA: So-
CIAL PROGRAMS FOR THE ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY (1990).
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